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Introduction
Since the earliest generative approaches to binding, one of the most enduring controversies has been the level(s) of representation where the binding theory should apply. While work in the Government and Binding framework suggested that the binding theory might require reference to D-structure, S-structure, and LF (e.g. Belletti and Rizzi 1988) , this position is made untenable by Chomsky's (1993) Minimalist elimination of D-structure and S-structure.
Consequently, the binding theory is relegated to the C-I interface (LF), which sits somewhat uncomfortably with the fact that binding exhibits properties typical of syntactic phenomena.
Hence, recent attempts have been made to bring the binding theory back from the C-I interface (e.g. Epstein, Groat, Kawashima, and Kitahara 1998; Hornstein 2000 Hornstein , 2006 Reuland 2001 Reuland , 2006 Kayne 2002; Zwart 2002 Zwart , 2006 Hicks 2006) , with the welcome result that the binding conditions may then be reduced to narrow syntactic operations such as Merge, Move, and Agree.
However, the Minimalist literature also provides apparently compelling evidence for the binding theory applying at LF, as Condition A is shown to interact with other interpretive phenomena assumed to hold at LF, namely quantifier (scope) interpretation, idiom interpretation, and bound variable interpretation (Chomsky 1993; Lebeaux 1998; Fox and Nissenbaum 2004; Sportiche 2006 ). This has been argued to show that these phenomena share a common input with Condition A, i.e. a single LF representation. Treating each type of interaction individually, this article reveals that such a conclusion may be premature. In particular, it is not Condition A that holds at LF, but rather an independent requirement that bound variables (including anaphors) must be c-commanded by their binders. The narrow-syntactic and interface approaches to Condition A make different empirical predictions with respect to the point in the derivation at which local c-command must hold between the antecedent and anaphor.
Evidence for a narrow-syntactic binding theory

Theoretical arguments
An approach which views the binding theory as a set of constraints applying at LF raises concern under Minimalist assumptions. Crucially, Minimalism must seek to explain why-rather than simply stipulate that-binding facts are the way they are. The Government and Binding framework was able to pin down a reasonably successful account of the locality constraints on binding through the definition of the 'Governing Category' (Chomsky 1981 (Chomsky , 1986 ). In the spirit of that approach, we can only realistically hope to find an explanation for why binding domains look the way they do if they are in some way related to the constraints governing movement.
Indeed, the classical binding theory has envisaged a single explanation for the common properties of binding and movement (e.g. c-commanding antecedents of anaphors/traces, locality constraints) since Chomsky 1973 . Chomsky (1993 ; Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) , however, abandon one of the major insights of generative syntax, and with it, all serious hope of explaining binding domains. Since movement must be considered a narrow-syntactic process, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is natural to assume that binding is too: for example, a narrow-syntactic approach to binding lets us make the strong claim that locality effects are uniquely determined by syntactic factors, and not by properties of the interfaces. In light of the fact that locality in both movement and binding is quite similarly constrained, an LF binding theory would involve a conspicuous redundancy in that very similar locality constraints would have to apply in narrow syntax (for movement) and at LF (for binding). This would surely be a glaring weakness in any Minimalist theory; (the effects of) the local binding conditions must therefore be determined in narrow syntax.
An ambitious but fruitful strategy in seeking an explanation for binding facts (rather than simply aiming for empirical coverage) is to derive a theory of binding purely from principles independently required in the framework. Recently, significant steps have been made towards reducing the binding conditions to narrow-syntactic operations. The analyses of Hornstein 2000 Hornstein , 2006 Reuland 2001 Reuland , 2006 Kayne 2002; Zwart 2002; Hicks 2006 outline different but related methods of explaining all of the central elements of the binding theory-including c-command, local binding domains, and the encoding of referential dependencies-within narrow syntax. Moreover, each of these shows that the properties of binding follow from one or more of the narrow-syntactic operations of Merge, Move, and Agree. The reader is invited to review the above works for further theoretical arguments for a narrow-syntactic binding theory.
This article concentrates largely on empirical evidence, since this is the evidence on which the argument for the binding theory at LF is most strongly defended. At any rate, we will see that even the empirical evidence alone is sufficient to demonstrate that the binding theory does not apply at LF.
Empirical evidence for a syntactic Condition B
As noted by Reuland (2001) , a syntactic approach to the binding theory will generally be better equipped to capture crosslinguistic variation in binding, since interface properties are, by assumption, universal. We can support this kind of theoretical argument with empirical data, showing either that processes assumed to apply at LF do not interact with Condition B effects in the predicted manner, or that factors which cannot be relevant at LF are capable of influencing the interpretation of pronouns.
Locality in Condition B domains does not hold at LF
Evidence from A-movement constructions could be used against Condition B applying at LF.
It has been argued by Chomsky (1995b: 327) that A-movement does not reconstruct (see, e.g., Lasnik 1999 for a summary of the arguments for this approach). Note that it is widely agreed that the experiencer (Mary) c-commands into the raising infinitival clause for the purposes of binding and so would potentially be capable of inducing Condition B effects with a pronoun within the infinitival clause, if it were sufficiently local.
Phonological factors can affect Condition B domains
In light of the possible circumvention, we seek data which are less dependent on particular theories of LF. If LF representations were indeed permitted to contain information concerning each of the movement steps in the derivation, we could look to other kinds of information widely assumed to be absent from LF representations to see if they can be critical in determining Condition B effects. This would be in principle unexplainable if LF representations were taken to be the input to Condition B. The first possible example of this is one observed by Fiengo and Higginbotham (1981) . A particularly well-known (but in many ways, problematic) piece of binding data is that pronouns embedded in 'picture noun phrases' (henceforth 'picture-DPs') which do not themselves contain an agentive or possessive subject can often be bound by the closest subject:
However, Fiengo and Higginbotham (1981) report that the judgment for (3) and similar sentences is rather variable across speakers, a fact also conceded by Chomsky (1982: 99, fn.24 However, a possible objection is that the effect is not due to phonological stress per se, but due to a related semantic effect, like focus: the pronoun is focussed in (4), but not (3). On the assumption that focus is encoded in LF representations, if Condition B were to apply at LF the contrast between (4) and (5) for many speakers could be (at least in principle) explained by an interaction of focus with Condition B.
Remaining with picture-DPs for the moment, Fiengo and Higginbotham (1981) also suggest that the specificity of a picture-DP determines whether the picture-DP constitues a local domain for Condition B. They observe a contrast between the ungrammatical (5) and an equivalent sentence with a demonstrative determiner: Nor can the number distinction between (7a) and (7b) be the source of the contrast, since when a null indefinite plural determiner is employed, the Condition B data pattern with the singular picture-DP in (7a) rather than the plural one in (7b):
4 Given the observations above concerning the stress assigned to the pronouns themselves in these constructions, we will assume that the pronoun receives neutral stress. On this prosody I do not find (7a) The Condition B effect in the English (7a) and (8) for some speakers is reflected in the Norwegian (10a) and (10b) respectively, while when a demonstrative is used in both (6) and (10c) the Condition B effect is obviated. If, though, as the contrast between (7a) and (7b) suggests for English, it is not specificity that is at stake, it may be some other property of DPs headed by a or a null determiner that accounts for why they fail to create Condition B domains. Furthermore, Hestvik (1990: 78, fn.20) notes that some speakers find (10b) grammatical, reinforcing the view that specificity is not necessarily the crucial factor. It is not unreasonable to speculate that the phonological 'lightness' of these determiners coincides with the failure of the DPs that they head to constitute a local binding domain. We could then suggest that for the speakers who judge (10b) grammatical, the improved acceptability over (10a) could be because an overt de-terminer et ('a') (Hellan 1988) We can conclude that the source of both these contrasts and those found in the picture-DPs with different determiners is the phonological 'weight' of the constituent (in a sense which remains to be properly clarified, though this is not crucial for the purposes of this article). An LF binding theory could not successfully accommodate such data, since phonological properties are not encoded in LF-representations. 
Case and inflectional features affect Condition B
It is not simply phonological properties that are assumed to be absent in LF representations.
In standard versions of Minimalism (Chomsky 1993 et seq.) , it is assumed that certain mor- Once we examine crosslinguistic data from other Germanic languages, it becomes apparent that these features interact with the possibility of bound readings for pronouns, a fact which is difficult to reconcile with an analysis of Condition B that applies at LF.
As outlined by Hoekstra (1994) , Frisian has a 3rd person singular feminine pronoun har and a 3rd person plural pronoun har(ren). Both may be locally bound without inducing a Condition B effect (somewhat unusually for non-reflexive 3rd person pronouns): (13) However, some Icelandic verbs assign a lexically selected oblique ('quirky') Case to their subjects, resulting in nominative Case assignment to their object or to the ECM subject. In contrast to (15), when the pronoun is an ECM subject assigned nominative Case, it can be bound by the quirky subject (Taraldsen 1996) (Taraldsen 1995) When the nominative ECM subject governs the verbal agreement, as in (17a), the bound interpretation is ruled out by Condition B; when default 3rd person singular morphology appears on the verb, the Condition B effect disappears, as in (17b). Thus, Condition B is again shown to be sensitive to morphosyntactic information (here, inflectional features) that is commonly assumed not to be accessible at LF. 3. Counter-evidence 1: trapping effects
For the reasons outlined in section 2.1 above, I follow Hornstein (2000) in assuming that all else being equal, a syntactic approach to binding is preferred over the LF approach. While empirical 7 Envisaging a binding theory that applies at LF, Taraldsen (1995) supposes that (17a) and (17b) involve different structural positions for the ECM subject at LF. He suggests that an agreeing ECM subject raises covertly to the Specifier of a Number Agreement head in the matrix clause. It is this covert movement which then brings the pronoun into a configuration in violation of Condition B. However, this explanation does not sit comfortably with more recent Minimalist assumptions. Agreement heads are commonly considered not not legitimate syntactic objects due to an absence of any interpretable features borne by them (Chomsky 1995b) , and more recently, agreement is determined at long distance in probe-goal configurations (without movement) by the operation Agree (Chomsky 2000 et seq.) .
evidence from Condition B effects supports this view, to confirm that binding relations are determined in narrow syntax rather than at LF we must show that a narrow-syntactic version of Condition A fares at least as well as the LF approach in terms of its empirical coverage.
The rest of this article teases apart and tests the predictions of the two competing approaches with respect to interactions between anaphor binding and other interpretive phenomena. This has proved a key battleground in the argument for where the binding theory applies, and the putative interactions are often taken as evidence that Condition A applies at LF. First I deal with cases where an anaphor embedded in a moved constituent is trapped in a 'high' position for the purposes of interpretation, due to other factors in the sentence; this is known as a 'trapping effect'.
Condition C interacting with anaphor binding
It is reported that trapping effects are observed in the interaction between Condition A and Lebeaux's (1988) conclusion that adjuncts may be 'late-merged' in the derivation, avoiding a Condition C violation. Under this approach, in (18a), the wh-phrase which argument merges as the object of believe, and then undergoes wh-movement. Only at this stage does the relative that John made merge, acyclically. At no point during the derivation is Condition C violated (as John never c-commands him), and the R-expression contained 8 I do not commit myself here to the status of Condition C or where its effects are determined. It is sometimes assumed that Condition C as a syntactic condition can be dispensed with (Chomsky 1982; Reinhart 1983a,b; Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993; Reinhart and Reuland 1993) . 9 See especially van Riemsdijk and Williams 1981; Freidin 1986; Lebeaux 1988 . Sportiche (2006 highlights that speaker judgements show some degree of variation for some putative adjunct/complement asymmetries.
within the relative clause will not be able reconstruct to the base position of the wh-phrase:
the sentence is correctly predicted grammatical. This option is not available in (18b) since the clause containing the R-expression is the complement of argument, and so must merge with argument to satisfy its thematic requirements. Hence, John, contained within the complement clause, must also merge before wh-movement takes place. Coreference between John and he results in a violation of Condition C, since he c-commands John before wh-movement takes place. When the clause inside the wh-phrase is a relative, as in (18a), it is assumed that a choice can in principle be made whether to merge the relative before or after wh-movement. In (18a) we are forced to choose the latter since merging the relative clause before wh-movement would induce a Condition C violation, just as in (18b).
In other cases, the presence of an anaphor within a DP-internal constituent could force a syntactic analysis in which that constituent is merged cyclically (before wh-movement), in order to ensure that an anaphor which is not c-commanded by its antecedent in its surface position is c-commanded by it at some earlier stage of the derivation. The grammaticality of (19) confirms that this is possible.
[Which stories about each other] k did the journalists publish t k Suppose, though, that the adjunct also contains an R-expression, which results in a Condition C violation if the adjunct reconstructs (i.e. is merged before wh-movement). Sportiche (2006) suggests that such cases provide evidence of the interaction of Condition A with Condition C, which he argues applies at LF (if not also elsewhere). As predicted, then, (20) 
[Which stories about each other's i characterizations of him j ] k would the typical male viewer j conclude the journalists i should publish t k (Sportiche 2006) The difference is explained as follows. In (20), reconstruction of the wh-phrase brings the typical male viewer into a configuration in which it is c-commanded by he, in violation of Condition C. In (21), however, reconstruction brings the pronoun into a configuration in which it is c-commanded by the the typical male viewer. So rather than Condition C we are dealing with Condition B in (21), which is satisfied since the the typical male viewer is not sufficiently local to the pronoun.
Sportiche appears to assume that that reference to reconstruction possibilities at LF is required in order to explain the Condition A data: some constituent containing the anaphor needs to be reconstructed at LF in order for the anaphor to be locally bound, while this also induces a Condition C violation at LF, since he then c-commands the typical male viewer. Yet it is not strictly true that a binding theory that applies at LF is directly supported by this data. A reviewer notes that it is possible to construct equivalent sentences that involve both an anaphor and an R-expression contained within a complement to the noun, as opposed to within an adjunct. Proposing (23), the reviewer suggests that such cases do exhibit the relevant contrast, predicted by a binding theory that applies at LF: However, such examples are problematic for reasons independent of any Condition C/Condition A interaction. Reinhart and Reuland (1993) , Hornstein (2000) , and Hicks (2006) show that reciprocals in certain syntactic positions exhibit properties equivalent to those of nonlocally bound reflexives in English (sometimes termed 'logophors'). Hornstein (2000: 186) and Hicks (2006: 140) provide examples suggesting that reciprocals embedded within the subject of a finite clause exhibit these nonlocal properties. For a number of speakers, nonlocal reflexives and reciprocals are judged as marginal or ungrammatical. Nonlocal reflexives and reciprocals are characterised by not requiring an antecedent that allows Condition A to be satisfied: they are subject to different principles of interpretation. By many binding theories, then, the reciprocal embedded within a subject position is not treated as a locally bound anaphor. A further complication with the evidence provided by (23) for Condition A applying at LF is that the contrast between (23a) and (23b) does not seem to be nearly as sharp as the original contrast presented by Sportiche (2006) . In fact, in both (23a) and (23b) I find the reciprocal hard to link to the required antecedent.
11
11 However, even if the contrast between (23a) and (23b) is robust for some speakers, and even if the reciprocal is of the type that requires local binding, given the modification to anaphor binding proposed in section 4 below, the contrast could still be explained without resorting to a version of Condition A that applies at LF.
Quantifier scope interacting with A-movement across an anaphor
Trapping effects are rather more robustly observed in the interaction of Condition A with quantifier interpretation. As noted by Aoun (1982) and Hornstein (1995) among others, raising a quantifier DP across an unmoved anaphor bound by it results in a trapping effect for the purposes of scope interpretation of the raised DP.
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In (24) Aoun (1982: 31-2, fn.7) attributes this observation to Luigi Rizzi, noting that this provides support for a binding theory which applies at LF, rather than at S-structure. 13 Lebeaux (1998); Fox (2000) ; Wurmbrand and Bobaljik (1999) take this as evidence that the inverse scope reading is not derived from long distance Quantifier-Raising of the universal in the embedded clause, since otherwise the trapping effect in (25a) is unexplained.
A modification to the analysis of Condition A effects
This effect is robust, strikingly, in a way that the data from the supporting arguments for Condition A at LF (below) are not. If we wish to maintain that a narrow-syntactic binding theory is the ideal we must do some work in explaining why LF-positions of the anaphor appear to be relevant. Fox (2000: 146, fn.9) hints that Lebeaux's (1998: 11) conclusion that a single LF representation must be the input to Condition A and quantifier scope interpretation is not necessarily correct. Leaving aside Condition A for a moment, note that exactly the same prediction would arise from simply stating that an anaphor must be c-commanded (regardless of how locally) by its antecedent at LF. Moreover, adopting an LF approach to Condition A of course offers no explanation for the appearance of the trapping effect in (25b), where a bound pronoun appears in the place of the anaphor. Clearly, in order to explain the trapping effect in (25b) we need a constraint independent of the classical binding theory, requiring variables to be in the scope of (i.e. c-commanded by) their binders at LF. Since anaphors are obligatorily bound variables, this constraint will also explain the absence of an inverse scope reading in b. An anaphor must be bound during narrow syntax by an antecedent which is sufficiently local to it.
14 This possibility has been explored in previous work. Romero (1998) adopts the proposal of an earlier draft of Lebeaux (1998) that i) Condition A must be met at some stage of the derivation, and ii) anaphors must be c-commanded at LF: "anaphor licensing is not just a matter of Principle A but also a matter of scope" (Romero 1998: 356) . I do not have access to this draft, but this is clearly not how the argument is presented in Lebeaux (1998) , where Condition A is argued to apply at LF. 15 Here I have chosen 'in the scope of' rather than 'c-commanded by' since as highlighted below, not quite all variable binding appears to involve strict c-command.
For the moment we will refer to the latter as Condition A; its precise formulation need not concern us here. Crucially, (26) makes two different empirical predictions from any LF approach to Condition A: i) An anaphor will be ungrammatical if not c-commanded by its antecedent both in narrow syntax and at LF.
ii) Local c-command need not hold between an anaphor and its antecedent at LF.
One criticism of the approach to anaphor binding in (26) could be that it introduces a redundancy with respect to c-command. The requirement that the antecedent c-command the anaphor holds both during narrow syntax (due to Condition A) and also at LF (for successful variable binding). While this is perhaps a technical inelegance, there is empirical evidence that the apparent redundancy really should be there: I suggest that this is in fact an advantage over the LF-only view of Condition A. As first noted (to my knowledge) by Reinhart (1976 Reinhart ( , 1983b , some well-known cases of variable binding do not in fact involve surface c-command.
As Hornstein (1995: 118) notes, typically a non-c-commanding quantifier can bind a variable if it is either the subject of a DP or embedded inside an adjunct PP.
(27) a.
[ (Kayne 1994) If both Condition A and the constraint on binding variables simply hold at LF then this fact is unusual: movement of every girl to the edge of the clause should allow it to locally c-command the anaphor, satisfying Condition A if it were to apply at LF. Yet if anaphors on the other hand must be both bound at LF and locally c-commanded by their antecedent during narrow syntax, then we have an explanation for the ungrammaticality of (29).
It should be noted here that Kayne (1994) (1995: 25-26) suggests that the binder for the pronoun undergoes Quantifier Raising (QR) into a position which c-commands the pronoun, rectifying the c-command configuration, which must hold at LF. While this may be plausible to account for some of the data (though apparently not why quantifier DP complements do not show the same behaviour), the particular account adopted is not crucial for the point I wish to make here. See also Hornstein (1995: 118-122) for further possibilities for analysis. 17 It is not clear to me how exactly the presence of a 'potential antecedent' can be used to determine the grammaticality of the anaphor in terms of a distinction between (29) and (30b). The intuition, as Hornstein (1995) reports, is that every girl's father is closer to the anaphor herself than every girl's, hence the ungrammaticality of (29 However, it could well be that for speakers who find these sentences acceptable to some degree, the possibility of interpreting the reflexive as a 'logophor' (a type of often stressed reflexive pronoun which does not necessarily require a syntactic antecedent) interferes with the judgments.
I believe that this is supported by a significant contrast for many speakers between the relative acceptability of (30a) and (30b). Logophoric reflexives are particularly common in the object position of picture-DPs as in (30a), which is certainly not entirely ungrammatical for me. On the other hand, all native speakers I have consulted find (30b) ungrammatical. I suggest that this is because reflexives as objects of transitive verbs cannot typically be logophors for most speakers, always requiring a local c-commanding antecedent.
Counter-evidence 2: idiom interpretation
Locality is the key difference between the narrow-syntactic approach to Condition A and an LF approach: the LF approach predicts that local c-command must hold at LF, while the syntactic approach does not. While Lebeaux (1998) concedes that Condition B must apply throughout the derivation rather than at LF, he nevertheless argues strongly against Condition A also applying during the derivation. Lebeaux proposes that a bundle of conditions related to semantic interpretation apply at a single level, LF: quantifier (scope) interpretation, bound pronoun interpretation, Condition A, and idiom interpretation. I have argued above that Condition A should not come under this group, but that the relevant aspect of anaphor binding which should do is subsumed by bound variable interpretation. We have assumed that quantifier interpretation also applies at LF, and seen that evidence from scope trapping effects is at least consistent with my approach. Our attention now turns to the evidence in the literature against it.
Subjectless picture-DP idiom chunks
Chomsky (1993) devises an argument that idiom interpretation is determined by reconstruction at LF to support his assumption that the binding conditions also apply there. However, when the predicate take pictures is interpreted idiomatically (i.e. with a camera), the only possible reading is the one where the reflexive is bound by the embedded subject. 18 Chomsky claims that on the idiomatic reading, take a picture of himself has to be interpreted at LF as a syntactic unit, so reconstruction is forced. So a reconstructed interpretation for the idiom chunk containing the anaphor results in the same type of trapping effect as seen above.
We might wonder whether there could be another explanation though. It has been suggested on several occasions (see Lebeaux 1998; Bhatt and Pancheva 2001; Nissenbaum 2004, and particularly Safir 1999 ) that there could be syntactic differences between the idiomatic construction and the literal one: it could be that the picture-DP in the idiomatic construction has a PRO subject controlled by the subject of take, as in (33). If so, regardless of any reconstruction of the wh-phrase, it will always contain a PRO which acts as the antecedent of the reflexive. Since PRO must be interpreted as coreferent with the subject of take pictures, this explains why the anaphor in that construction cannot be bound by the matrix subject.
If (33) is plausible, such cases tell us nothing about whether or not Condition A applies at LF: the binding domain for the anaphor in question is its minimal DP, so the wh-movement of that DP is irrelevant to binding. Condition B effects suggest that the PRO analysis is indeed plausible, as the idiomatic take pictures also differs from the literal reading in terms of Condition B. Assume that pronouns have to be free in their minimal DP. On the literal reading of (34a), the grammaticality of the bound reading for the pronoun follows. On the idiomatic reading though, the equivalent interpretation is ungrammatical, only explained as a Condition B violation if a PRO subject is inside the DP, as in (34b). Bhatt and Pancheva (2001) suggest that more generally, in cases where a matrix verb's semantics require its agent to corefer with subject of its DP complement, a PRO subject is obligatory. This correctly predicts the following contrast: is a creation verb, while retell (ideas) is not. As Fox and Nissenbaum (2004: 479) concede, we might equally assume that creation predicates force a PRO subject in their DP complement. As before, it seems highly plausible that picture-DPs contain a PRO subject when the agent of the picture-noun has to be interpreted as the subject of the predicate which selects it.
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This takes away the argument from idiom and creation verb interpretation that Condition A applies at LF. Lebeaux (1998) claims that in some idiom constructions, no PRO subject analysis will be avail- (Lebeaux 1998) The crucial question is whether the binding of the reciprocal always has to be by the deepest embedded subject, so by Mary and John in (36a), the girls in (36b), and Bill and Sue in (36c).
Picture-DP idiom chunks containing subjects
During the derivation, in each sentence the anaphor reaches a position in which it can be bound by the higher antecedent (in the final position in (36a) and in the intermediate trace position
in (36b)/(36c)). Yet idiom interpretation would require the interpretation of the lowest copy 21 I do not commit myself here to a particular theory of PRO interpretation, nor to the stage of the derivation at which PRO interpretation is determined. (Presumably, the choices will be the same as for anaphor binding; narrow syntax or LF.) There are too many (well known) differences between PRO and anaphors for me to suggest here that a narrow-syntactic approach to binding can naturally be extended to accommodate control.
of the DP which contains the anaphor. After reconstruction, the anaphor would remain in the c-command domain of the higher antecedent, while it would only be in the local c-command domain of the lower antecedent. So if Condition A applies at LF, only the lower reading should be possible for the anaphor. But if only bound variable interpretation is required at LF, then the higher reading should remain possible. Lebeaux (1998) claims that in each case only the lower antecedent is possible, supporting his conclusion that Condition A applies at LF. Here I simply disagree with Lebeaux's judgment, and many speakers feel no preference at all for the lower reading over the higher one. If so, and idiom interpretation does require reconstruction, then these sentences provide evidence that only bound variable interpretation (and not Condition A) applies at LF. DPs and their movements at LF proposed by Diesing (1992) , Runner (2002) argues that certain constructions involving idioms such as this cannot be assumed to form a complete unit at LF as Chomsky (1993) Condition A would be met in narrow-syntax, and reconstruction still leaves the anaphor in a position c-commanded by its antecedent, satisfying the condition on bound variables. So the LF-only approach predicts (37b) to be ungrammatical with the expletive construction, while my approach predicts that there should be no difference between the construction with the expletive and the one without. While Fox and Nissenbaum (2004) claim the judgment for (37b) supports the former, once again the crucial judgment seems highly contentious. I feel that there is simply no contrast whatsoever, a view supported by Uchiumi (2006) , whose survey of native speakers found both (37a) and (37b) to be judged within the acceptable range. As Uchiumi concludes, the conclusions that Fox and Nissenbaum draw based on these data fall some way short of being convincing. They assume that the ungrammaticality of the bound reading for the pronoun in (38a) is the result of two contradictory requirements: reconstruction having to apply so that the bound pronoun is c-commanded at LF, but not being able to apply since this would induce a Condition A violation-if, of course, Condition A also applies at LF. In (38b) on the other hand, we are dealing with a coreferential pronoun rather than a bound one and so there is no requirement for reconstruction, and Condition A is met at LF. The problem for the approach to anaphor binding in (26) is that if Condition A applies in narrow syntax, then it is met in (38a) after movement, while reconstruction of the wh-phrase still leaves the anaphor in a position c-commanded by its antecedent: the sentence is incorrectly predicted to be grammatical.
The judgments here are not as sharp for me, and I find (38b) less than perfect. Some speakers I have consulted find no contrast, with both sentences being acceptable. Indeed, Uchiumi (2006) reports that some of his consultants judged (38a) as worse than (38b), some judged them the other way around, and some perceived no contrast at all. This high degree of speaker variation in these sentences leads me to suspect that the example might be more complicated than Fox and Nissenbaum assume. As noted above, typically judgments become quite variable when the reflexive in question is logophoric, rather than a locally bound anaphor. It is well known that when a picture-DP has no subject, the reflexive object of the picture-noun may exhibit certain properties suggesting that the reflexive may not be a true anaphor. Therefore in (38), in theory we could be dealing with a logophor, and these are not subject to Condition A.
Fox and Nissenbaum concede this much, but claim that logophoric reflexives do not typically take objects as their antecedents. They claim that choosing President Clinton as the object of the matrix clause rather than the subject removes the possibility that we could be dealing with a logophor, and so Condition A really is at stake here. However, things are more complicated still, since logophors can also take non-c-commanding antecedents:
(39) Max's i eyes watched eagerly a new picture of himself i in the paper (Reinhart and Reuland 1991) Fox and Nissenbaum apparently fail to notice that in (38) In short, the fluctuation in speaker judgments and the variation across similar sentences points towards the possibility that the logophoric reflexive is interfering in the crucial contrasts.
In fact, Sag (1992, 1994) ; Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and assume that all of the classic connectivity effects in wh-movement constructions are instances of logophoric reflexives. Note that in these cases, objects can also bind picture-DP reflexives in the left-edge of CP, just as subjects can: The possibility of the matrix subject (43a) or object (43b) binding the reflexive is apparently overridden if the wh-phrase has moved across an embedded subject coreferent with the matrix object or subject respectively. Presumably this gives the embedded subject (and coreferent matrix argument) some sort of higher discourse prominence, and so the logophoric reflexive is degraded when bound by the less prominent argument. If we were indeed dealing with a true anaphor in such cases, this sort of effect would not be explained at all. Clearly then, such factors make it extremely difficult to be maintain that the original contrast that Fox and Nissenbaum (2004) report for (38a,b) is significant. Even if it is, the chances are that we are not really testing Condition A effects there in any case.
Conclusion
When it comes to figuring out where the binding theory applies, the stakes are highest when it comes to Condition A, largely because the evidence for the binding theory applying at LF in the first place is strongest from Condition A effects. For example, Lebeaux (1998) , who claims that Condition A applies at LF, nonetheless suggests that Conditions B and C apply during the derivation rather than at LF. We have seen that various interpretive phenomena do not necessarily interact with Condition A in the way that they are often assumed to if Condition A applies at LF. Some interactions between interpretive phenomena and anaphor binding are indeed robustly observed, most notably in scope trapping effects when a quantifier DP is raised across an anaphor bound by it. However, we have shown that the interacting factor with scope is not Condition A (i.e. the requirement that an anaphor be locally c-commanded by its antecedent) but rather an independent constraint that bound variables must be c-commanded at LF by their binders: the same trapping effect is observed with bound pronouns in the place of anaphors.
At the same time, we have only been able to draw tentative conclusions that a narrowsyntactic version of Condition A makes more successful empirical predictions than the LF approach. However, by no means do the two approaches to Condition A (and indeed, to the binding theory in general) start out on an equal footing. As noted at the outset of the chapter, empirical evidence for a narrow-syntactic Condition B strongly argues against an LF approach, since its effects can be influenced by elements which cannot be present in LF representations:
we have seen various examples cross-linguistically showing that Condition B interacts with
Case features of pronouns, verbal agreement, and phonological factors. Importantly, theoretical concerns also lead us to strongly favour a narrow-syntactic approach, in particular because it allows us to determine locality effects uniquely by syntactic factors, and allows more promising avenues for capturing crosslinguistic variation. Building on the findings of recent research (Hornstein 2000; Kayne 2002; Zwart 2002 Zwart , 2006 Hicks 2006 ), a possible reduction of the binding conditions to independent syntactic operations provides scope for a complete elimination of the binding theory, and so the Minimalist ideal is within sight.
